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What U.S. Can Do in Middle East — II

by Georgiana G. Stevens

While debate continues among Washington policy makers as to how the United States can help the Middle East, it is important to note certain factors in the area's political economy which limit what the United States can reasonably expect to accomplish there. The first premise on which any foreign aid program for the Arab states must operate today is that these states are all in varying stages of revolution. The current revolts are directed against their own ruling classes and simultaneously against the West.

The clearest evidence of the anti-Western sentiment in Arab countries was revealed at the United Nations General Assembly in Paris when the Arab-Asian bloc achieved almost consistent solidarity against proposals sponsored by the United States. The internal revolutions of the Arab nations take different forms. In essence, however, they express the tensions between an old order based on Islamic rules of conduct in simple pastoral economies, and a new attempt to adopt a modern competitive world economy by reinterpreting Islamic doctrine to fit present-day popular needs.

This internal struggle has led to violence

and rule by decree in Iran and Egypt; to half a dozen coups, ending in military dictatorship on the Kemalist pattern in Syria; and to as yet unresolved clashes of extremists in Iraq and Lebanon. Religious communalism plays a well-recognized role in Lebanon, where the population is almost evenly divided between Sunni Moslems and Christians; and a subtler but no less dangerous role in Iraq where the Shi'a sect is increasing its fundamentalist influence at the expense of the more tolerant Sunnis now in control.

In coming to any understanding with the governments in nations whose internal conditions are in flux, the United States must also face the fact that it now shares with France and Britain the stigma of imperialism. American postwar policy has been so predominantly favorable to the needs and desires of our two Western allies that this country has inevitably come to appear to the Arab-Asian bloc as a new enemy of their aspirations for independence. American action on the side of law and order in Iran and Egypt has been freely interpreted in Arab countries as indicating a renewed attempt by the West to obtain political as well as economic toe-holds in the

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Middle East. However extreme this reaction may appear from the vantage point of Washington, it indicates the decline of faith in American disinterestedness and good will which comes as a shock to any American who visits the Arab states today. Even more evident is the traumatic effect of the loss of Palestine. It is clear here, too, that American public opinion has greatly underestimated the depth of feeling among the Arabs about Palestine and the degree to which the United States is held responsible for what is still regarded as a disastrous Arab defeat. This obsession colors Arab thinking to such an extent that otherwise intelligent and progressive leaders suggest that the real objective of the Point Four program in the Middle East is to improve territory near Israel for Israel's eventual benefit. At the same time Arab leaders resist any resettlement of Arab refugees at United Nations expense, on the ground that the proposed resettlement is also designed to make it easier for Israel to expand.

From this it is plain that the Arab states are engaged in quite a different cold war from that now occupying the attention of Western diplomats. The Arab states are fighting the vestiges of imperialism and the intrusion of the new state of Israel with such fervor that they are not yet aware of larger threats to their independence. These twin obsessions, plus their own internal tensions, make this an extremely inauspicious moment for the United States to evolve a constructive working rela-

tionship with the Arab nations either in the economic or the strategic sphere. Given this situation, what can the United States still do to re-establish good relations with the Arab East?

Two Possible Approaches

There seem to be two possible approaches left to the United States government and to American citizens. On the official side, it is urgently necessary that the Arabs become convinced of the often expressed American policy of neutrality between Israel and the Arab states. One way to demonstrate real neutrality would be to re-examine our present policy of equating 1 million Israelis with 30 million Arabs in the so-called 50-50 division of American aid funds to the area. Another step which would go far to relieve present tensions on both sides of the precarious truce boundaries between the Arabs and Israel would be to guarantee permanent boundaries revised along the lines recommended during the last four years by the UN. Finally, as a step toward solving the problem of 860,000 Arab refugees, the United States could take a more positive line by assuring that they receive cash compensation for their lost properties, as is provided in existing UN resolutions. With this much accomplished to its credit, the United States would be in a position to press for refugee resettlement, thus liquidating the most serious obstacle to peace in the Middle East.

Pending such positive measures to prove our disinterestedness, it will do

no good to increase the volume of United States Information Service activities or proffer financial aid without strings or try to induce Arab governments to focus their attention on wider strategic issues. There are, however, areas in which better feeling can be cultivated toward this country. For example, the prestige of American schools, colleges and hospitals in the Arab nations still remains high. Extension of their facilities by private rather than government funds from the United States, could greatly help to fortify these islands of good will in a sea of discontent. Similarly American donations to scholarship programs for the study of Middle East peoples on the spot are steps in the right direction. Private grants to Arab institutions to build up much needed libraries and scientific laboratories would go far to rebuild mutual confidence.

All measures such as these, if started without undue delay or public stir, would still be welcomed and understood as tokens of genuine concern and friendship. Assistance from private sources has the added advantage of being free from the stigma of imperialism. It can be inconspicuous and far more effective than official grants in aid. In the present strained situation such aid cannot come too quickly, for the cleavage between East and West is dangerously sharp in this vital region.

(This is the second part of an article on what the United States can do in the Middle East. The first part was published in the July 1 issue. Mrs. Stevens, a political analyst in the Office of Strategic Services during World War II, has recently returned from a visit to the Middle East.)

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Raw Materials Needs and Tariffs

Now that Congress, on June 20, has authorized the Mutual Security Program of foreign aid for another year, the paramount foreign policy concern of the Truman Administration is to liberalize international trade. This concern has been mounting in the State Department during the past two months as a result of gradual realization that in spite of four years of Marshall plan and mutual security help, many of our allies, notably Britain, have not been able to expand their foreign commerce sufficiently to stabilize their economies.

The Administration has the basis for a concerted campaign to encourage liberalization in the report which President Truman received on June 23 from his Materials Policy Commission.

Following an eighteen-month study of American needs and supplies over the next twenty-five years, the commission found that the need for raw materials would increase 50 to 60 percent by 1975 to support a doubling of gross national product to an annual rate of \$566,000,000,000, a population of 193,000,000 and a 20,000,000 increase in the "working force" to 82,000,000. According to the commission, the United States by 1975 will be importing about one-fifth of its industrial needs at a cost of \$3,000,000,000.

'Problem of Rising Costs

Given these circumstances, the commission reached the conclusion that the United States is harming its industry and its economy by trade restrictions that limit this country's access to raw materials produced abroad.

As a guiding principle, the com-

mission recommended that the United States seek the greatest possible security at the lowest possible cost. Present trade policies, on the contrary, stimulate the upward trend in materials prices in two ways. First, they increase costs to consumers in the United States; second, they impede production of the materials abroad, and limited production means higher prices. The logic of protectionism that guided the United States during most of the period of falling materials prices, from 1900 to 1940, no longer serves the best interests of the nation.

Need for Liberalization

Not only does trade-restrictionism promote scarcity of the materials the United States urgently needs for itself, but it takes no account of the contemporary interdependence of nations. Many raw materials may be imported duty-free, but the products fabricated from those materials face a tariff. Yet, the commission commented, "the processing of ores abroad would be to our national advantage. . . . The production of aluminum abroad, for example, could use the ample hydro-power available near bauxite deposits at a time when costs of producing ample electricity for the United States' rapidly expanding aluminum industry are threatening to rise. . . . The overriding national interest points clearly to the desirability of eliminating the obsolete tariff barriers to the entry of materials into the United States."

To make possible the liberalization of trade, the commission recommended that the American government have the authority to give tariff

benefits without obtaining the reciprocal benefits from abroad which the Trade Agreements Law has required since its enactment in 1934. "There are limits to the technique of reciprocal trading," the report said. "The United States can make a tariff concession only in exchange for a tariff concession by another country. Moreover, the authority is restricted to reduction of tariffs and does not permit their complete elimination on any commodity. The commission believes that elimination of the tariff on many industrial materials would be of benefit to the United States, quite apart from reciprocal action by other countries."

"Besides actions which the United States can take alone," the report said, "it should take the initiative in urging more vigorous international action to solve trade and distribution problems which can be dealt with effectively only on an international basis." This recommendation underlines difficulties the Administration faces in promoting a radical change in trade policy, for a few days before the publication of the report the House of Representatives adopted an amendment to the 1952 price-control bill which in effect severs the connection of the United States with the International Materials Conference. At a time when the United States calls for international political and military cooperation, congressional support for trade-restrictionism and trade isolationism is on the rise. However, one presidential candidate, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, has urged a high level of trade among nations.

BLAIR BOLLES



What Should U.S. Do About Tunisia?

by Harry R. Rudin

Dr. Rudin is Colgate Professor of History and chairman of the History Department at Yale University. His chief teaching interest is in the field of European diplomacy and imperialism.

DURING March and April this year 11 Arab and Asian countries led by Pakistan endeavored to get the United Nations Security Council to consider the grievances of the Tunisian nationalists against France. The Council decided against consideration, with the United States abstaining.

This was the first time that the United States opposed consideration by the Council of a matter threatening the peace of the world. It is possible that our abstention was due to a desire not to antagonize France, at a time when we needed its support for the creation of the European Defense Community with West German participation. Secretary of State Dean Acheson explained to one critic that the United States wanted France and Tunisia to continue their negotiations for a settlement without any interruption, presumably in the hope that an accommodation of claims and counterclaims might result in a modus vivendi that would keep the ticklish question out of the public forum of the Security Council. Washington has been criticized throughout the world for this decision, which was out of keeping with our previous policy of having serious questions brought before the Security Council, as well as a far cry from the attitude so widely proclaimed in the "bold, new program" of Point Four in 1949.

Events will force the United States to review its abstention, for the 11 Asian and Arab countries which failed to get action by the Security Council, with the addition of Syria and Lebanon, are now seeking action by the General Assembly. Moreover, France is pressing the United States for affirmative support of its policies in North Africa and Indo-China.

U.S. Must Choose

What should American policy be? Sooner or later we shall have to choose between the French and the Tunisians. On June 23 it was reported that the United States would oppose the Arab-Asian request for a General Assembly session. This decision may further alienate millions of Africans, Asians and Arabs, whose support we can ill afford to lose at this critical time in history.

In preparation for possible war with Russia, the United States is relying on a great strategic line across North Africa and Arabia, running from Casablanca to the Persian Gulf through Morocco, Algeria, Tunis, Libya, Egypt and the Suez Canal. This whole area is in virtual revolt against European domination or control, a revolt which makes it seem that our main defense line is built on shifting sands. Discontented people in this area will not find it difficult to hamper the military efforts of the West by blowing up munition dumps or by interfering with our air and naval bases. Moreover, the recent NATO decision at Lisbon to include Tunisia and Morocco within the North Atlantic defense perimeter, without prior consultation with the peoples concerned, means that the inhabitants of these terri-

tories will be in the front line of the next war, obliged to fight in defense of a liberty they have yet to taste. Being human, these people are naturally and violently opposed to a policy which makes their interests wholly secondary to European security needs.

The security needs of the West may well result in a further postponement of the explicit and implicit promises made long ago and repeated often that at the proper time peoples in colonial areas will receive the right to govern themselves. The treaty of May 12, 1881, which placed Tunisia under French protection, stated that French "occupation shall cease when the French and Tunisian military authorities shall have recognized by common consent that the local administration is capable of guaranteeing the maintenance of order." After 70 years of "temporary" occupation, Tunisians may well wonder when the conditions of their independence can be met. At the present time they have no reason to think that the Fourteen Points, the Atlantic Charter, the provisions of the United Nations Charter and of the international bill of rights have produced any change in their status. What must they think when the United Nations refuses even to consider their cause?

Racial Problems Aggravated

In fact, it may appear that the prospects of gaining freedom darkens as grandiloquent pronouncements become more elevated in tone. The losses of the Western powers in the Far East and the increased demands of the European economy for land, food and strategic minerals have

combined to make Europe more dependent than ever upon Africa. Because migration elsewhere is greatly curtailed, thousands of Europeans have settled in Africa since the end of World War II. This settlement of Europeans in Africa is ominous—it makes possible a repetition of the white minority problems already acute in Tunisia and South Africa.

Peoples in colonial areas have not forgotten that the United Nations in effect ordered 850,000 Arabs to move out of their lands to make place for people who could not find a home in Europe or elsewhere. Malan's racial policies in South Africa, his demand for the incorporation of Basutoland, Swaziland and Bechuanaland into the Union, his refusal to allow the former mandate of South-West Africa to become a trust territory under the UN—all these are signs of serious trouble for Africans in the near future. The proposal to create a British dominion out of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, a dominion which would be under white control, is meeting with almost unanimous opposition from Africans.

These are but a few of the African problems that may come before the UN in one form or another in the future. This is why the implications of American policy concerning Tunisia are so serious. Our present policy may easily lead millions of people the world over to the conclusion that no relief for their grievances can be found in the United States, the United Nations or NATO. It would be tragic beyond all imagining if our policy forced them to look to a Russian victory for the fulfillment of their hope for freedom. Recent experiences in the Far East should be a warning of the hazards created by the failure to pay adequate attention to the demands of peoples in the so-called colonial areas. Moscow's policy is based on the doctrine that

by Max Ascoli

Dr. Ascoli is editor and publisher of
The Reporter.

OUR French allies have taken quite a pounding lately because of the way they have treated the Tunisian Nationalists. And, for a change, Secretary of State Dean Acheson has been bitterly criticized, but this time by a different set of critics: the friends of nationalism-at-large. He should, they say, have let the discussion on Tunisia be brought before the United Nations. The use of having the United Nations discuss conflicts that it cannot settle—this is something we cannot quite make out.

Probably the French authorities in Tunisia acted with excessive toughness in handling the extreme Tunisian nationalists. But that is rather difficult to judge at this distance, just as it is difficult to know whether the nationalist leaders are capable of bearing national and international responsibility or, if entrusted with power, of improving the lot of their own people. Of course, the era of

the Western democratic states can be made to collapse if their empires are taken away from them.

The most important thing today is to stop making any more vague promises, no matter how eloquent the words may be. The time has come to take past promises out of their verbal cocoons and to commit ourselves unequivocally by positive acts and a definite time-schedule to the granting of increased autonomy and possible independence to colonial areas. These areas must also be made economically viable. Otherwise, we may see in other continents a repetition of the history of those nations in Europe which achieved political independence at the end of

colonialism is gone, and of course it has been replaced by less recognizable types of imperialist exploitation, like communism or, for that matter, like Peronism.

But all this does not mean that anyone anywhere who calls himself a nationalist should be able to count, as if we were a sort of automatic Legal Aid Society, on American support. National independence can be a calamity to a people, and to the rest of the world, if its leaders do not know that independence means partnership in the international community. Nehru said it best: A new nation cannot be like a frog at the bottom of a well.

To help along the severing of the new nations from the old, diplomatic and technical assistance, unglamorous but effective, is far more in order than UN debates. Nothing can ultimately be more fatal to the international organization than to become the repository of all the noble intentions, the custodian of all the universal rights, which no universal power can enforce. Neither can the UN be the midwife of all the nations to be born. Just let's look at Libya.

World War I but are now behind the Iron Curtain because they found themselves without the economic base necessary to maintain political independence.

These are difficult decisions to make, but they are necessary if the United Nations is to have a future and if the forces of democracy are to win the present struggle.

Strange Lands and Friendly People, by William O. Douglas. New York, Harper, 1951. \$4.

A colorful informal book recording the impressions garnered by Justice Douglas in the course of his travels in the Middle East and India. The author's sympathetic insight into the problems of peoples in underdeveloped countries gives particular value to his suggestions about future American policy in these areas.



Can Diplomacy Break World Stalemate

Two years after the outbreak of war in Korea, West and East appear to have reached a stalemate both in Europe and Asia. The United States, which has assumed leadership in the United Nations as well as in NATO, and the U.S.S.R., which dominates the Eastern European bloc and plays an important, although perhaps not decisive, role in molding the policy of Communist China, may now be close to striking a military balance of power.

The Military Balance

While the West is superior in terms of industrial potential and surface navies, the U.S.S.R., plus its satellites, has larger land forces at its disposal, to which must be added China's manpower, and is believed to have built a considerable fleet of submarines. Estimates of the respective air power of the two sides fluctuate with current developments, but some American experts contend that the U.S.S.R. may now be outdistancing the United States in the size and striking capacity of its air fleet. In contrast to the one-sided situation that existed shortly after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the U.S.S.R. as well as the United States now has atomic bombs, although the head-start made by American atomic production is believed to give this country an advantage over the Russians. American authorities have indicated that the United States is now capable of producing atomic weapons and hydrogen bombs, but while little has been heard on this score from Moscow, cautious prognosticators do not discount the capacity of Russian technicians to catch up with the manufacture of the most deadly

weapons in the armory of the West.

The resulting military stalemate is most clearly exemplified by the situation in Korea. There, after two years of bitter warfare, both sides are regarded as capable of warding off an offensive, but neither is believed to be in a position to launch an all-out attack with impunity or to carry the war beyond the confines of the Korean peninsula without unleashing the world conflict which, according to the coolest heads in Western capitals, neither the United States nor Russia wants. This is the conclusion reportedly reached by British Defense Minister Earl Alexander after a first-hand survey of the Korean situation in mid-June.

In Europe, too, although this is as yet less visible, both West and East appear reluctant to take the steps which might ultimately precipitate a military showdown. The signing of the Bonn accord does not of itself bring about the recruitment of the 12 German divisions to be included in the proposed European defense force; and no sooner had the accord been signed than non-Communist groups in West Germany, France and Britain began, for a variety of reasons, to express doubts and hesitations about the creation of a German military force even under the safeguards of the European Defense Community. The Kremlin, for its part, did not immediately resort to the more drastic measures anticipated by some Westerners, such as the official creation of an East German army—in part, at least, it is believed, because the U.S.S.R. and its satellites are no more enthusiastic than the West about restoring military power to the Germans.

The military stalemate is paralleled by a stalemate in the political struggle. On the surface, communism appears to have suffered a setback in Western Europe, notably in France with the jailing of the Communist leader Jacques Duclos and in Italy with the strict police measures taken to prevent a Communist demonstration against General Matthew B. Ridgway. At the present time, however, there are no signs that communism in France and Italy has been defeated in the sense that Communists have turned to prodemocratic parties.

Stalemate in Politics

In Italy the chief beneficiary of the de Gasperi government's drive against communism has been the notable revival of pro-Fascist sentiment revealed in May by the third round of municipal elections. Well-informed Europeans believe that the only effective method of weaning French and Italian workers, farmers and intellectuals from communism is through the creation of a genuinely democratic party of the left which would vigorously carry out the reforms promised by the Communists. The paradox of the existing situation in Western Europe is that while American aid, particularly under the Marshall plan, has helped to prevent the seizure of power by extremists of the right or left, it has also tended to postpone the moment when governments now in office must come to grips with basic economic and social problems. The danger remains that if and when American aid declines, the discontent now artificially held in check may break out into the open.

European political leaders, painfully aware of their dilemma, believe that internal tensions present a more immediate threat to stability than Russian military aggression. They also fear the havoc another war would wreak on the weakened structure of European society. These sentiments are at the root of what is called "neutralism." To dismiss this "neutralism" as inspired solely by the Communists is to misunderstand the state of mind in Europe. The Kremlin takes advantage of Europe's fear of war by representing the United States as the nation which would not hesitate to plunge the world into a new conflict. This is the significance of propaganda from Peiping and Moscow about "germ warfare," which is designed to make the Europeans wonder whether or not Washington might use this weapon in case of war. Responsible people in Europe and Asia dismiss these Communist charges as lies, but they would feel more at ease if American spokesmen would refrain from public statements about the efficacy of atomic and hydrogen bombs, atomic missiles and biological weapons now at the disposal of the United States.

It is in this atmosphere of stalemate and suspense that the Kremlin has launched a new diplomatic campaign. The purpose of its campaign is to win support in Western Europe for a conference, first, on Germany but probably later for a broader conference on Asian as well as European problems, which Moscow considers to be inextricably linked. In the United States it is generally assumed that Soviet diplomats have no freedom of maneuvering and that therefore the appointment of Andrei A. Gromyko to London and of Alexander S. Panyushkin, former ambassador to Washington, as ambassador to Peiping is but another act in a well-worn play. There is considerable

evidence, however, that the Soviet government proposes to use diplomacy to break the military and political stalemate and, if possible, to widen every fissure that may appear between the United States and Western Europe. This does not mean that Mr. Gromyko, to take one example, will seek to propitiate Aneurin Bevan in the hope that Mr. Bevan will eventually become Britain's prime minister. On the contrary, it is much more likely that Mr. Gromyko will attempt to show the British Conservatives, who are not uniformly enthusiastic about American policy, the disadvantages of restoring the economic and military power of Britain's former competitors, Germany and Japan, and the benefits to be reaped from *rapprochement* with Russia in Europe and Asia.

"Containment" and Diplomacy

The policy of "containment" formulated in 1947 by George F. Kennan, now ambassador to Moscow, was based on the assumption that if Russia were checked by the growth of military and economic strength in the West, the Soviet regime would either disintegrate or become more mellow. The U.S.S.R. is unquestionably facing serious political and economic problems of its own, not least among them continued resistance in its Eastern European satellites, as indicated by renewed purges, most recently in Rumania where Ana Pauker suffered the fate reserved for dissident Communists. For the time being, however, there appear to be no signs of disintegration within the U.S.S.R.; and far from becoming more mellow, the Soviet leaders have launched a violent "hate America" campaign which is reported to have alarmed Mr. Kennan.

This campaign, however, is not regarded in Washington as a prelude to war. If war is averted, yet the cur-

rent stalemate persists, the United States will face the problem whether it should leave the diplomatic initiative to Moscow or initiate a diplomatic drive of its own. Secretary of State Dean Acheson has frequently said that once the West has created "situations of strength" it would then be in a position to negotiate with Russia on a basis of equality. Two questions now emerge. How shall we determine when the West has achieved "situations of strength"? And what would then be the context of possible negotiations with Russia? Would the West expect "unconditional surrender" by Russia—a policy George Kennan deprecated in our wartime dealings with Germany and Japan, as indicated in his recent book, *American Diplomacy: 1900-1950*? Does the United States look toward the forcible overthrow of the Soviet government and the liberation by arms of the satellite countries? Or would the West accept the present balance of power in Europe and Asia as a basis for at least temporary stabilization?

The West has been so busy during the past five years in rebuilding its depleted military and economic resources that little thought has been given to the ultimate objective of "containment." The "containment" policy is not new. When the British, in the 19th century, contained Russia in the Baltic and the Black Sea, in the Middle East and at the Khyber Pass, they knew they would not achieve a 100 percent victory.

One approach to the present stalemate is for the West to define the world conditions which the West would regard as tolerable. "We must state our purposes in positive terms," said Dwight D. Eisenhower on June 24, "rather than in terms of negative containment."

VERA MICHELES DEAN

As Others See Us

It has been clear for a considerable time that the most disturbing issue between our Western European allies and the United States is Europe's uneasiness over its dependence on American economic and military aid. The emphasis placed by the British on the slogan, "Trade, not aid," is only one symptom of this state of mind in Europe.

The Conservative *Daily Mail* of London complained in May about "the argument, or row" between Britain and the United States over the Mediterranean command. "We sometimes wonder," it said, "what the United States thinks we are. After all, the British Empire is not some Central American Republic. It is not Nicaragua, and it deserves better treatment than it gets."

A similar feeling is expressed by the independent German weekly, *Christ und Welt*, which commented as follows on June 12 on the importance attached by European statesmen to the outcome of the American presidential election: "Our dependence on America is shameful. No less alarming is the fact that our development in peace, the honor of our women, the education of our youth, the stability of our currency,

and our entire life free from terror, all owe their existence solely to half a dozen American divisions between the Elbe and the Rhine and to a few hundred or a few thousand American atom bombs. Seven years after the end of the war, with a production which in part is well above that of 1938, Western Europe is more defenseless than she has ever been since the days of the French Revolution. This situation will not change until Europe acquires strength of her own. And Europe will not acquire strength of her own without divisions of her own—which means, without German divisions. . . . To strengthen Europe to the point that will permit it to manage without American troops and to obtain the withdrawal of the Soviets from the heart of Europe at the price of the Americans' withdrawal behind the English Channel and the Straits of Gibraltar—that should be the goal of all who refuse to look upon Europe's dependence as a permanent condition."

The belief in France that internal Communist agitation rather than external attack by Russia constitutes the real danger does not lead responsible French commentators to demand the outlawing of the Communist party. Writing on June 7 in the independent, progressive, often "neutralist" *Le Monde*, the political analyst Maurice Duverger is skeptical

about the effectiveness of repressing communism in France.

Any attempt to do so, he fears, may lead to the application "of the methods of Senator McCarthy, but on an infinitely larger scale because of the size of the French Communist party." What, he asks, "will then be left of democratic principles?" Referring to the study of why Frenchmen vote Communist undertaken by the magazine *Réalités*, Duverger contends that this study "confirms what we have always said, namely that the 5 million Communist voters are not genuinely Communist, that they do not really differ from the mass of Frenchmen in their fundamental reactions, and that they are equally attached to democratic liberties in the Western sense of the word, but that they are dissatisfied with their lot and consider the Communist party their only effective defender in this respect. The dissolution of the party will not change anything at all in this basic situation. Undertaken by a government whose policy has rather clearly assumed a 'reactionary' character, it will appear to those who vote for the Communist party to be yet another device to resist their claims and to keep them in an unjust social condition. The Communist trend in the country may be strengthened thereby and will surely find some way of expressing itself in the end."

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In the next issue

A Foreign Policy Report

Turkey: Partner of the West

by Lewis V. Thomas
of Princeton University

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